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Abstract 
In his seminal paper, Gordon (1954) argued that, in a situation of open access and competition, the market would not 
lead to the most efficient solution in resource use. Almost four decades earlier, in 1911, a Danish economist, Jens 
Warming, put this issue and made a very similar analysis for the fisheries sector.   
The purpose of this research is to make a reflection on that paper and highlight the proposed explanation for the 
common property problem. This paper studies the legacy of this interesting fisheries economist to the history of 
economic thought and put in evidence its role as a “precursor” in important topics of investigation of the New Institu-
tional Economics. This research also ask what went wrong and why did the important achievements of Warming’s 
research had not the justified academic applause and practical impact. 
 
Keywords:Jens Warming, fisheries, open access, regulation 
 




From the Ronald Coase Institute site:  
 
New Institutional Economics incorporates a theory of institutions –laws, rules, customs, and norms– 
into economics. It builds on, modifies, and extends neoclassical theory. It retains and builds on the 
fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition –the basis of the choice theoretic underlies 
microeconomics. It has developed as a movement within the social sciences that unites theoretical and 
empirical research examining the role of institutions in furthering or preventing economic growth. It 
includes work in transaction costs, political economy, property rights, hierarchy and organization, and 
public choice. It involves work in political science, law, sociology, anthropology, and other social 
sciences. 
 
NIE can be seen as a new variant, from the later 20
th
 century, of the so-called Institutional 
Economics developed in the first part of the century and including important names as Thorstein 
Veblen, Wesley Mitchell and John Commons.
1
 
The author that we are analyzing here could not integrate this school because of a simple rea-
son, his age. Jens Warming lived and researched in the early 20
th
 century. In a certain sense, he 
can be seen as a contemporary –perhaps more as a “precursor”– of some of the most important 
names of the “old” Institutional Economics School. In his work there are not special references 
to these authors –Veblen, Mitchell or Commons–but there are significant references to authors 
of the German school, which are usually referred as important references and influence on the 
first Institutional Economics. So, why introduce here such an investigator? 
The reason is that in 1954, Scott Gordon published a paper in the Journal of Political Econo-
my that went on being a mark in the History of Economic Thought. In his seminal paper “The 
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 See Veblen (1899), Mitchell (1910), Commons (1931) and Hodgson (1998). 
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Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery”, Gordon argued that, in a 
situation of open access and competition, the market would not lead to the most efficient solu-
tion in resource use. The common property nature of fish resources implied that, in an unregu-
lated fishery, the result would be the expansion of the industry to a point of economic, even 
biological, overfishing. So, there is nothing like an “invisible hand” and it is the common prop-
erty nature of the resources and the presence of externalities in the process of capture that are 
the root causes of the mismanagement of the resources and the so-called “Tragedy of the Com-
mons” (Hardin, 1968). The origins of modern Fisheries Economics can be traced back in the 
50’s with that paper of Gordon (1954), and also with the papers of Scott (1955) and Schaefer 
(1957). Perhaps more important: this paper is today seen as a perfect classic for Natural Re-
source and Environmental Economics. And, perhaps more important for this investigation, after 
this paper, several investigations on property rights and “tragedies” in natural resource use; 
“commons” conceptualization and public regulation; externalities and public goods; institutions, 
models of governance and development, were developed. In almost all of those reflections we 
encountered for the most important names of NIE: from Alchian, Demsetz, Cheung or De  
Alessi, to Bromley, Coase, Williamson, North or Ostrom,
2
 everyone was touched by the singu-
larity and profundity of this paper and, in different ways and directions, went on developing the 
fundamental legacy of Gordon’s ideas, the four last names even becoming recognized Nobel 
prize in Economics. 
But in fact, there is another, more antique, article that put the problem and suggested a similar 
approach to its understanding. In a simple paper, in 1911, a Danish economist, Jens Warming, 
precisely, put this issue and made a very similar analysis for the fisheries sector. The purpose of 
this research is to make a reflection on that paper and highlight the proposed explanation for the 
common property problem. The paper studies the legacy of this interesting fisheries economist 
to the history of political economy and ask what went wrong and why did the important 
achievements of Warming’s research had not the justified academic applause and practical im-
pact. His proximity –and differences– with “old” and New Institutional Economics is hig-
hlighted. 
 
2. Jens Warming (1873-1939): biographic notes 
Jens Warming’s family belonged to the intellectual elite of Denmark. His father, Eugenius 
Warming, was an important and influential professor of Botany in the University of Copenha-
gen and his contributions on ecology were internationally recognized.  
Jens Warming was graduated in Law, in 1897, in the University of Copenhagen, and went to 
Nebraska/USA where he worked, teaching for three years, in a Danish school. After his return 
to Denmark, he made a special master degree in Economics, usually given to lawyers who 
wanted to develop a career in the administration. So, Warming went on pursuing a remarkable 
career in the Danish Central Department of Statistics (1904-1919).  
He was not a “genuine economist” (Topp, 2008) but he also went on being a part-time pro-
fessor of Economics and Descriptive Statistics in the Danish Agricultural University and in the 
University of Copenhagen. This lack of formal graduation in Economics gave him some prob-
lems. He was frequently criticized for insufficient knowledge of economic theory and, when he 
finally got a permanent tenure in the University, it was in Statistics, never getting the desired 
chair of Economics. Even his mentor, H. Westergaard, leader professor in Economics in the 
University of Copenhagen, seemed not to understand the relevance of his work. Jens Warming 
tried to get the tenure in Economics for two times but, in the first time, it was L. Birch –another 
later well-known Danish economist– to be chosen and, in the second, it was his previous stu-
dent, A. Nielsen, who got the professorship in Economics.  
Some personal animosity played an important role. But it was, perhaps, his proactive attitude 
towards government regulation and intervention at the microeconomic level –that was not in 
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 See, for example: Alchian (1965), Alchian & Demsetz (1973), Demsetz (1967), Bromley (1985, 1991), 
Cheung (1968), Coase (1960), Williamson (2000), North (1990), Ostrom (1990). 
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accordance with the mainstream view, in the 20’s, that the deregulation was required– that gave 
him some bitter objections in the academic playground (see Eggert, 2010, and Topp, 2008). 
His fundamental work rested in the Descriptive Statistics. In 1929, Warming published a 
textbook on Danish statistics, with an applied economic perspective. For more than a decade, 
his book of Denmark characterization was extensively used by Danish students in Economics. 
Teaching economic theory was not, naturally, his task, but in his statistics textbooks he went on 
making several critiques on mainstream economics and including his theoretical contributions. 
He also tried, from 1921, to write a textbook in Economics but it was never published because 
of the dispute between a professor of Statistics and the professor of Economics in the Copenha-
gen University. 
After the flaw of getting the desired tenure in Denmark he went on trying to get applause ex-
ternally. In 1926, he submitted an essay to an international competition on the theory of wages. 
He did not win the competition but he had an “honorable mention” and the recognition from 
foreign colleagues that made him to pursuit his efforts in the economic area, finally publishing a 
paper in the Economic Journal. After all, his ability in recognizing and applying the conceptua-
lization of marginal revolution was evident and his developments in the area of wages and rents 
rested upon the most recent developments in Economics. In the paper he published in the Eco-
nomic Journal, Warming made an interesting presentation of the multiplier (see Topp, 1981) on 
the link between Keynes theory and Warming’s research. He also made important seminal ref-
erences about the problem of identification in econometric analysis.  
Besides his knowledge about the economic science, his work has only a few references. 
Wicksell and Marshall are the most cited, but also Fisher and Germanic authors, especially 
about the quantitative theory of money. This parsimony use of bibliographical references is also 
very far from what is the academic “political correct” attitude. 
 
3.  On rents of fishing grounds revisited: open access and regulation 
Warming’s legacy in Economics counts for several achievements. Our approach highlights his 
contribution in the fisheries area and the way he treats the problem of common property. That 
is, perhaps, the most innovative in his research and the one that percusses some important dis-
cussions of recognised authors of Institutional Economics.  
Forty three years before the publication of Gordon’s seminal paper, Jens Warming made an 
important investigation about the problems of open access in the allocation of a common-
property resource and presented his results in a short article (1911) “Om Grundrente af Fiske-




In the paper, Warming compared the rent available from fishing grounds and land. Land is, in 
the most part, in private hands and land rents are a privilege of private landowners, whereas 
fishing grounds are not privately owned but are considered common property. However, the 
differences do not change the basic economics of both forms of management. Warming stated 
that the common property nature of open access to fishing grounds without charges tends to 
decrease the rent and he proposed to alleviate this through transferable fishing licences. 
The core idea of the paper reflected the Marginal Revolution. In a competitive economy, a 
worker earns a wage equal to the value of his marginal product. But, according to Warming, 
there were examples in the economy where this did not hold. One of these exceptions was the 
case of the fisheries where the problems occurred due to a “lack in the organization of society”. 
These exceptions did not question the theory of marginal productivity as a general fundament 
but, some of them, had practical relevance. Warming explained that, under open access, the 
potential rent in a fishery is dissipated. As no one has property rights over the resource and there 
                                                 
3
After this article, he made several references of his results in two unpublished books: a textbook from 
1921, previously referred, and another 1926 manuscript. This last manuscript, which was intended for an 
international audience, included an English new version of his 1911 model and became the main ingredi-
ent of a second article on fisheries, in 1931. 
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is no possibility of exclusion, the permanent introduction of a newcomer in the fishery must not 
cess until the difference between revenues and costs are zero, that is, until all the rents are dissi-
pated. Biological regulation, as closed seasons or mesh size specification, can prevent the bio-
logical overexploitation of resources but not the economic overexploitation. He also pointed out 
that a tax, equal to the difference between average and marginal revenue, at the optimal level, 
would lead to an optimal fishery. This idea is also very interesting, clearly reminding the pro-
posals of pigouvian taxes to internalise the external effects. Note that it was only in the subse-
quent decade of the 20’s, that those ideas were mostly divulgated by Pigou. 
In his 1911article, Warming did not elaborate much regarding the practical implications of 
his proposals but 20 years later he published another article ,“The Danish Right to Eel 
Weir”,1931, going into new details and presenting a graphical presentation to explain his find-
ings (Warming, 1931). 
 
Figure 1.Graphical presentation of Warming’s Model 
   
Source:Gislason, G. (1995), “Fisheries management in Iceland and J. Warming’s contribution to the 
Economics of the Fisheries”, Finnish Economic Papers, 8 (1), 57 
 
The returns from fisheries are shown in the vertical axis, whereas in the horizontal axis we 
have the fishing effort measured by the number of fishermen. 
The curve QF shows the diminishing returns as the fishing effort increases. The line PD 
represents the marginal cost.  
In this context, total benefits are maximized when the number of fishermen is OA, and the to-
tal income of fishermen is the area OABP.  
Warming compares fishing with farming and states that the number of workers hired by a 
profit maximizing farmer will be such that the last worker hired produces as much as he re-
ceives in wages.  
The total income from fishing is, in fact, OABQ. So, the value PBQ is the sea rent for access 
to the resource on the fishing grounds. If no one collects this sea rent and fishing is free, the 
average income of OA fishermen will be higher than AB and, as this rent is divided among fish-
ermen, their mean income rests AT, that is, the median height of OABQ, so the value RSQ is 
equal to the value STB.  
High average profit draws more people into fishing. Equilibrium is achieved where fishing 
effort is OC and total income is equal to the total cost of fishing, PBQ=BED. The additional 
fishermen produce only ACEB and could produce more in some other pursuit. They only re-
ceive the required ordinary income by having PBQ added to their production. The sea rent is 
wasted in the sense that it subsidizes the income of extra fishermen whose production does not 
correspond to their wages. 
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Finally, he maintains that in order to prevent that the number of fishermen goes up to OA, 
fees should be collected for the licences. A private owner would collect such fees and the fee 
ought to be BT, to result in the optimal number of people in the fishing activity. This would 
provide PBTR in the form of fees, received by the “land” owner or by the Government. 
In this 1931 paper, Warming introduces some additional features: 
- A right for the coastal owner to charge a fee for the fishing right in the areas near the coast, as 
it was proposed, implied a regulating effect that, according to the author, corresponded to the 
property right of land. The right of the owner to regulate the entry prevented the excess of fish-
ing effort and maximized the rent guaranteeing the optimal number of fishers. 
- Warming also stated that free access could lead even to a negative marginal product implying 
the utilization of immature stocks. So, even in times of high unemployment –and that was the 
case in the 30’s– it was better to keep away from fishing the superfluous fisherman. 
We must note that this last article was a response to a specific situation of Danish fisheries. In 
fact, at the time, Danish fishers demanded that the “Right to Eel Weir” should be abolished. 
This right to eel weir was an exception from the freedom of access that was the general rule in 
Danish fisheries. According to the Danish Fisheries Act –from the end of the 19
th
 century– no 
one could be excluded “from a properly visited and marked fishing ground”. But there was an 
exception: traditional Danish Law granted shorefront owners the right to set eel traps in the sea 
adjacent to their land property and property owners were entitled to charge fishers for permis-
sion to set traps in some of this specified offshore areas.  
In one of their annual Assemblies, the Danish Fishing Association proposed to abolish pri-
vate eels trapping rights with unanimity. Warming article was a protest against this change in 
governance. Warming opposed the introduction of free access to replace rental fishing in the 
limited area. He argued that this would lead to the total dissipation of rent. He was in favor of 
maintaining the existing system. His argument was that it produced the optimal regulation re-
sult. Instead of abolishing this system, he also proposed to introduce a similar system in all Sea 
governance. 
The debate faded away, in 1931, leaving the law unchanged. But in 1955, when the debate 
was revived, the economic arguments of Warming remained ignored and the Danish parliament 
abolished the “Right to Eel Weir” (Gislason, 1995) and the private shorefront owners were 
compensated for this loss of privilege. 
Another important confrontation point in this debate is the following: Note that his clear op-
position to maintain extra-workers in fishery, appealing to the economic efficiency in the sector, 
could not be well accepted at the time. In the last quarter of 1930, the Great Depression was at 
his maximum level in Denmark (Eggert, 2010). Still Warming argued strongly against using 
employment in fisheries as an alternative in recession days, because extra fishers would impose 
an extra external cost to the other fishermen, dissipating the potential rent. And added another 
problem: because of the typical inertia in this sector, where socio-professional mobility is diffi-
cult (Acheson, 1981), after entering, the superfluous fishers would not move, fast enough, for 
more productive sectors, when the recession went over. 
 
4. What went wrong? Causes of academic and political failure 
Why these important achievements had not the justified academic applause and practical im-
pact? What went wrong? How can we explain that the paper of Gordon (1954) is always pre-
sented as a classical one –one of the seminal articles in the area of socio-economic studies in 
natural resources and the environment–and the study of Warming (1911) remains a “perfect 
unknown”, having, at the best, a minimum footnote in some academic texts? The investigation 
of how the sociological conditions of Science development affects the conceptualisation, the 
methodological framework and the results of a specific scientific domain, seems to have here, a 
good example.  
First, there were some difficulties of personal and of academic nature. Of course, the fact that 
his article on fisheries was published in a Danish journal, in the original language of the author, 
was a significant factor for its weak disclosure. Only in the 80’s, an English translation of the 
seminal article of 1911, by an important fisheries economist, P. Andersen, and a study from 
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Hannesson and Anderson on the contribution of Warming, gave the relevance that his legacy 
deserved (Andersen, 1983; Hannesson & Anderson, 1981). In the 50’s, during a round table, 
promoted by FAO, to discuss the advances in Fisheries Economics, one of Warming’s former 
Icelandic students, O. Bjornsson, called the attention to the work of Warming and made an Eng-
lish presentation of his model. It was only in 2010 that the Journal History of Political Economy 
published an English version of his article from 1931, translated by H. Eggert.  
Note that the personal animosity and suspicion in the academic circuit that was referred made 
difficult his task. Also, some singular idiosyncratic aspects, as the one cited of not including 
extensive bibliographical references, were not in conformity with the usual policy in academic 
context. 
Second, we must note that his findings and recommendations were not in line with the main-
stream: not in accordance with the “sign of the times” and not in line with the usual methodo-
logical, theoretical and practical development of fisheries sciences. By one side, a lot of his 
results were, indeed, interesting in practical terms for fisheries regulation. But, by the other, 
they derived from an economic analysis and, in the early 20
th
 century, when they were pro-
posed, that economic perspective had no impact on the decision-makers of fisheries manage-
ment. In fact, only in the 60’s and 70’s the Economics of Fisheries went on being really consid-
ered. Until the Second World War the management of fisheries were only administrative and the 
focus (and the decisions) came exclusively from biology. 
Even for economists, it seems that his results were always in the opposite side of the main-
stream. He proposed a regulation approach where economists and fishers associations proposed 
more liberalisation. He proposed the creation or, at least, maintaining the existing property 
rights, when everyone defended the free access. The basic lines of his thought were that a free 
market economy did not automatically lead to optimality and that government regulations were 
needed. The suspicion on the “invisible hand” would be a recurrence in his work. When the 
economic environment of the 20’s battled in the sense of deregulation, the proposals of Warm-
ing of state regulation and control could seem to be misadjusted. Of course, there were also 
important authors, like Pigou, that defended the necessity of more regulation to solve the prob-
lems of market failure in the presence of externalities, but the “air of the temps” called for more 
liberalization. 
At the same time, he was against the use of fisheries as a sector to absorb the unemployment 
resulting from Depression. That is, his defence of economic efficiency and sustainability of the 
sector put him in the unpleasant role. Even in a situation where the usual defenders of free mar-
ket proposed a governmental oriented policy, his answer was in the opposite side. It seems that 
he was always on the “wild side of the street”.  
From another point of view (the one that highlights the specific conditions of Science devel-
opment), we must note that the results of his investigation are, in fact, very close with those of 
Gordon and Scott (in the 50’s) that made the birth of modern Fisheries Socio-Economics.
4
But, 
as Topp (2008) pointed out, even if the theoretical fundaments and arguments are the same, the 
papers are very different with respect to scope and composition and perhaps that explains the 
different forms they were seen and used by the academic community. The Gordon article was 
directly focused on Fisheries Economics and resulted from a program of investigation that, at 
the time, tented to apply the economic theory to fisheries contemporary programs.
5
 This article 
was published in a highly considered journal (Journal of Political Economy) and in a special 
period, when there was a group of researchers very interested in the results of public regulation 
in this area. By the contrary, Warming findings reflected his study about the flaw of competitive 
                                                 
4
And note that were fundamental steps to the posterior discussion on important topics as the “Tragedy of 
the Commons”, property rights and efficiency; institutions and development; natural resources, sustain-
able development and governance models. 
5
 Note: In the late 50’s and early 60’s, FAO went on organizing interesting conferences where a debate 
about property rights and fisheries regulation took place. Although he was not a fisheries economist, the 
presence list includes a name that dispenses comments: Ronald Coase.  
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market but did not deal with contemporary and international debate on regulation (Coelho, 
2011, 2012).  
Another interesting issue relates with the special links he created and developed with marine 
biologists and policy makers. First, it should be stressed that his research contains important 
elements of fisheries management that had no explicit reference in Gordon’s article. Perhaps for 
economists this debate did not seem very important at the time, but that should have been im-
portant for biologists and executives. For example, his discussion about the concept of MSY 
(Maximum Sustainable Yield) and the impossibility of getting the most efficient result with 
only the usual command and control conservation measures had to have impact in the biologist-
commanded, traditional fisheries management. 
Along the period of his research developments, the current situation in the sector of fisheries 
went on some important changes. By the end of the 19
th
 century, the idea of inexhaustible fish-
eries was slowly being discussed. The leading fisheries biologist T. Huxley and other important 
biologists began to worry about the decline of fish stocks in the Baltic Sea and in the North 
Atlantic. This laid to the formation of the ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea) in 1902. With headquarters precisely in Copenhagen, ICES pretended to be a forum of 
multidisciplinary discussion on practical fisheries problems. It was also in this context that Pe-
tersen, an important researcher in Marine themes, published a paper on the North Pacific fur 
seals and, consequently, one of the first cooperation treaties in the area of fisheries conservation 
was introduced.  
But the focus was still on Biology. As we said, only in the 50’s, the modern Socio-Economics 
of Fisheries –with the research of Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955), and the modern Fisheries 
Biology– with the studies of Schaefer (1957) and Beverton and Holt (1957), evolved. Jens 
Warming tried to communicate with marine biologists and to present his vision about the rele-
vance of economics in the treatment of the conservation problem. He sent his papers to impor-
tant researchers in this area (Kyle, Petersen and Hjort), even for the Danish prime minister –
former fisheries minister–, but with few results.  
This last reference put also in evidence his work with politicians and other social scientists. 
In fact, as we said, his participation in the political discussion, at several levels, was significant. 
His approach to the Danish Fisheries Association and to other important decision-makers –in 
the Government and in the Fisheries-Labour Organizations– was noticed. His social commit-
ment was clear. Sadly, the results were not the expected. His intervention at the practical level 
had not visible effects and, at the theoretical level, his work was only distinctive. The focus on 
Biology still maintain for decades. The multidisciplinary approach proposed by the ICES was 
delayed. Even in the new millennium, the participation of economists and other social scientists 
–sociologists, political scientists and anthropologists– is still limited. 
 
5. Final remark. Actuality and perspectives for the future 
A final reference on the actuality of his thought: Warming’s convictions and recommendations 
have, in the present, a real relevance. His preoccupation with superfluous workers in fisheries is 
now the subject of an important discussion on the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The CFP 
points to the necessity of making the balance between the social stability in the coastal areas, 
mostly dependent on fishing, and the objective of getting sustainable fisheries, implicating a 
reduction in the fishing effort to put it in line with the necessary renewal of the stocks. But these 
are contradictory objectives. To solve this equation is, perhaps, the major difficulty in the 
process of CFP reform. Now, with the economic crisis and the high levels of unemployment in 
the European economy, it seems more difficult to ask for a reduction of capacity. 
Also, some problems, like “quota hopping”, bring the idea that a system of quotas and TACs 
are not enough to get sustainable fisheries. That is, the command and control instruments, that 
made the core of the conservation and management regime of the CFP, can have results in terms 
of biological over-exploitation but, as Warming defended, cannot solve the economic problem. 
This problem rests, basically, in its common property nature. The solution of the externalities 
implies a socio-economic analysis and the introduction of Rights Based Management methods. 
The generalization of tools like Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) puts a lot of pressure in 
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the traditional discussion of efficiency vs. equity when privatizing use rights in fisheries (Coel-
ho et al., 2011). 
Also, at the international level the discussion about high sea fisheries Governance: property 
rights are in the core of fisheries management and the problem becomes more complex when 
fisheries are transboundary by nature. Extended fisheries jurisdiction gave the coastal states 
property-rights and the potential of a sustainable management of fisheries. However, the general 
evolution towards more exclusive rights didn’t mean the exclusion of free access in internation-
al fisheries. The Law of the Sea (1982) doesn’t exclude the principle of the “freedom of the 
seas” that remains in force in the High Sea. 
One of the most penetrating subjects that emerged as a consequence of this new framework is 
the management of international fisheries commons. The so-called straddling stocks manage-
ment was in the root-causes of serious “fish-wars” in the 90’s. The conviction of the coastal 
states, that they would be entitled “de facto" property rights on the transboundary resources, was 
not correct. These virtual rights ended for showing emptiness. Actually, these resources remain 
as “international common property" and the usual “tragedy of the commons” is well reflected in 
the overexploitation of these resources. The vague, imprecise form as they are defined in the 
Convention of 82 is in the origin of the problem; so they can be called the “unfinished business” 
of the Law of the Sea. Is the solution an enlargement of the 200 miles Economic Exclusive 
Zones? 
Finally, it should be noticed that, in a certain measure, Warming circumvented the traditional 
opposition between old Institutional Economics and Neoclassical Economics. He anticipated 
important issues of New Institutional Economics, such as “commons”, public regulation, law & 
economics, models of governance, etc. His heterodoxy is clear, but the use of marginalism as a 
fundamental framework seems to be in advance and taking, not only fundamental topics of re-
search, but also the methodological positioning of New Institutional Economics. He also “builds 
on, modifies, and extends neoclassical theory”. 
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